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Hybrid Threat Frameworks and Policies

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Hybrid threats generally arise from state and nonstate actors targeting systemic vulnerabilities within a democratic government’s societal, industrial, financial, etc. structures and institutions. Hybrid threats/warfare from a policy framework perspective are difficult to define as they cross civilian and military “functions.” This report describes high-level frameworks and policies that have been established to address hybrid threats along with organizations that have developed them. Two Defense Systems Information Analysis Center (DSIAC) subject matter experts performed open source searches, as well as searches of various U.S. and foreign government document repositories, to find organizations, projects, documents, and articles related to hybrid threats and frameworks and policies established to address them. A compiled list of these organizations and descriptions of their materials as  
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The Defense Systems Information Analysis Center (DSIAC) is a DoD IAC sponsored by DTIC to provide expertise in nine technical focus areas: weapons systems; survivability and vulnerability; reliability, maintainability, quality, supportability, and interoperability; advanced materials; military sensing; autonomous systems; energetics; directed energy; and non-lethal weapons. DSIAC is operated by SURVICE Engineering Company under contract FA8075-14-D-0001.

A chief service of the DoD IACs is free technical inquiry (TI) research, limited to 4 research hours per inquiry. This TI response report summarizes the research findings of one such inquiry jointly conducted by DSIAC.
ABSTRACT

Hybrid threats generally arise from state and nonstate actors targeting systemic vulnerabilities within a democratic government’s societal, industrial, financial, etc. structures and institutions. Hybrid threats/warfare from a policy framework perspective are difficult to define as they cross civilian and military “functions.” This report describes high-level frameworks and policies that have been established to address hybrid threats along with organizations that have developed them. Two Defense Systems Information Analysis Center (DSIAC) subject matter experts performed open source searches, as well as searches of various U.S. and foreign government document repositories, to find organizations, projects, documents, and articles related to hybrid threats and frameworks and policies established to address them. A compiled list of these organizations and descriptions of their materials as well as a bibliography of other sources related to hybrid threats and the execution of hybrid warfare are provided in this report.
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1.0 Ti Request

1.1 INQUIRY
What high-level frameworks or policies have been established to address hybrid threats and what organizations have developed them?

1.2 DESCRIPTION
The inquirer’s colleagues are developing a conceptual framework to help policy makers better understand the complexity of hybrid threats. To start, they are interested in conceptualizations of hybrid threats, particularly high-level frameworks or categorizations that have been developed for policy makers, and the organizations that developed them.

2.0 Ti Response

Hybrid threats generally arise from state and nonstate actors targeting systemic vulnerabilities within a democratic government’s societal, industrial, financial, etc. structures and institutions. The vulnerabilities can be created by many things such as historical memory, legislation, old practices, geostrategic factors, strong polarization of society, technological disadvantages, or ideological differences. A wide range of means (political, economic, military, civil, and information) can be used to attack and exploit the vulnerabilities. If improperly addressed through the application of political, economic, and military tools, these situations can escalate into hybrid warfare where the role of the military and likelihood of violence increase significantly.

Hybrid threats/warfare from a policy framework perspective are difficult to define as they cross civilian and military “functions.” The legal framework for countering hybrid threats is certainly a significant issue and a challenge for liberal democracies to overcome considering hybrid threats come from illiberal (partial democracy, low-intensity democracy, empty democracy, or hybrid regime) governments and nonstate actors that don’t follow international/domestic laws and norms.

2.1 U.S. AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS DEVOTED TO HYBRID THREATS
The Defense Systems Information Analysis Center (DSIAC) staff searched open sources for documents, articles, and other information related to hybrid threats and warfare with a focus on government organizations and materials related to development of frameworks and policy
(vs. defining threats and/or courses of action to implement the policies). It should be noted that in addition to these government entities, there are numerous academia, research, think tank, etc. institutions that support them with research, analysis, and reporting on hybrid challenges and threats and provide recommendations on policy. Some of the more prominent government institutions noted in the catalogued materials are listed in Sections 2.1.1 (U.S) and 2.1.2 (European Union [E.U.] and United Kingdom [U.K.-+]).

2.1.1 U.S. Government Institutions

1. **U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG).** The AWG provides operational advisory support globally and rapid solution development to the Army and Joint Force commanders to enhance Soldier survivability and combat effectiveness, and to enable the defeat of current and emerging threats in support of Unified Land Operations. [http://www.awg.army.mil/](http://www.awg.army.mil/)

2. **U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).** START is a DHS Center of Excellence headquartered at the University of Maryland. It is a university-based research and education center comprising an international network of scholars committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of terrorism in the United States and around the world. It investigates fundamental questions about terrorism, including the following:

   a. What is the nature of terrorism in the world today? How has terrorist activity evolved over time? How does terrorism vary across geographies? And what do these trends indicate about likely future terrorism?

   b. Under what conditions does an individual or a group turn to terrorism to pursue its goals? What is the nature of the radicalization process?

   c. How does terrorism end? What are the processes of deradicalization and disengagement from terrorism for groups and individuals?

   d. What actions can governments take to counter the threat of terrorism?

   e. What impact does terrorism and the threat of terrorism have on communities, and how can societies enhance their resilience to minimize the potential impacts of future attacks?

A few of START’s hybrid threat-related projects are listed as follows:

b. Anatomizing Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries  
   http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/anatomizing-behavior-chemical-and-biological-non-state-adversaries

c. Building a Unified Infrastructure for Data Integration on Political Violence and Conflict  

d. Consensus Framework for Informing Decision-Making in the Biological Threat Characterization Program  

e. Developing Integrated Radiological and Nuclear Detection Architecture for the Interior and International Mission Space  
   http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/developing-integrated-radiological-and-nuclear-detection-architecture-interior-and

f. Resources and Resilience: A Computational Model of Strategic Influence  
   http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/resources-and-resilience-computational-model-strategic-influence

g. Shadows of Violence: Empirical Assessments of Threats, Coercion and Gray Zones  

Additional information on START is available at the following links:

- START  
  http://www.start.umd.edu/

- START Policy & Practice  
  http://www.start.umd.edu/policy-practice

- START online publications reference (many related to the hybrid threat)  
  http://www.start.umd.edu/publications

- START relevant publications geared towards the Homeland Security enterprise  
  http://www.start.umd.edu/publications?type[]=10&type[]=2087&type[]=13&type[]=110&type[]=2110&type[]=9&type[]=11&type[]=15&type[]=111&type%5B%5D=111

3. U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. This commission is tasked by the U.S. Congress with developing a consensus on a strategic approach to protecting the crucial
advantages of the United States in cyberspace. Membership includes Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Deputy Director of Homeland Security, Deputy Secretary of Defense, three members appointed by Senate majority leader, two members appointed by Senate minority leader, three members appointed by Speaker of the House of Representatives, and two members appointed by minority leader of the House.


4. **U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)**. The JCS consists of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. These senior uniformed leaders are tasked with advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Homeland Security Council, and the National Security Council on military matters including hybrid threats and warfare.

http://www.jcs.mil/

5. **U.S. National Security Council (NSC)**. Since its inception under President Truman, the NSC has been the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The Council also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/

6. **U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**. The NCTC leads and integrates the national counterterrorism (CT) effort by fusing foreign and domestic CT information, providing terrorism analysis, sharing information with partners across the CT enterprise, and driving whole-of-government action to secure our national CT objectives. The NCTC operates as a partnership of organizations to include the Central Intelligence Agency; Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation; Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security; and other entities that provide unique expertise such as the Departments of Energy, Treasury, Agriculture, Transportation, and Health and Human Services; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They develop, integrate, implement, and measure the effectiveness and progress of strategic operational plans for U.S. CT activity as well as assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments or agencies for CT activities according to strategic operational plans and consistent with applicable laws. The NCTC CURRENT serves as a secure website dissemination mechanism for terrorism information produced by NCTC and other CT mission partners. The NCTC Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) is the U.S. Government’s central repository of information on international terrorist identities.
7. **U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC).** The SFRC is charged with leading foreign-policy legislation and debate in the Senate. It is generally responsible for overseeing (but not administering) and funding foreign aid programs as well as funding arms sales and training for national allies. [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/)

8. **Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).** United States Code (USC) Title 10 provides that the SecDef has “authority, direction and control over the Department of Defense,” and is further designated as “the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.” The same statute also ensures civilian control of the military. The SecDef is responsible for exercising command and control, for both operational and administrative purposes subject only to the orders of the President, over all Department of Defense forces. OSD is the principal staff element of the SecDef in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, and fiscal and program evaluation responsibilities. [https://www.defense.gov/About/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/](https://www.defense.gov/About/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/)

### 2.1.2 E.U. and U.K. Government Institutions

1. **The Council of the European Union.** This E.U. council represents the member states' governments; it is also known informally as the E.U. Council. National ministers from each E.U. country meet as part of this council to adopt laws and coordinate policies. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/)

2. **European Council.** This E.U. institution defines the general political direction and priorities of the E.U. It consists of the heads of state or government of the member states, together with its President and the President of the Commission. It is also the leading human rights organization for the E.U.. [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/)

3. **European Commission (EC).** The EC is the executive of the E.U., which promotes its general interest. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en)

4. **European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE).** This CoE serves as a hub of expertise supporting the participating countries’ individual and collective efforts to enhance their civil-military capabilities, resilience, and preparedness to counter hybrid threats with a special focus on European security. It is intended that the Center will offer collective experience and expertise for the benefit of all participating countries, as well as the E.U. and NATO. It will follow a comprehensive,
multinational, multidisciplinary, and academic-based approach. 
http://www.coedat.nato.int/

5. **European Defense Agency (EDA).** The EDA is an intergovernmental agency that falls under the authority of the Council of the E.U., to which it reports and from which it receives guidelines. The EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives, and introduces solutions to improve E.U. defense capabilities. 
https://www.eda.europa.eu/

6. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Centre of Excellence for Defence Against Terrorism (COE DAT).** The COE DAT is composed of 62 multinational billets with representatives from eight nations focused on providing key decision-makers with realistic solutions to terrorism and CT challenges. It is designed to complement NATO’s current resources while also serving as NATO’s Department Head in Education and Training for CT. 
http://www.coedat.nato.int/

7. **NATO Energy Security Center of Excellence (ENSEC COE).** This organization is composed of military and civilian experts from NATO and Partner Nations. The Steering Committee guides the activities of the Center through yearly Programmes of Work coordinated with NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). It assists Strategic Commands, other NATO bodies, nations, partners, and other civil and military bodies by supporting NATO’s capability development process, mission effectiveness, and interoperability in the near, mid, and long terms by providing comprehensive and timely subject matter expertise on all aspects of energy security. 
https://www.enseccoe.org/en

8. **UK Ministry of Defense (UK MOD) Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).** This UK MOD think tank helps inform defense strategy, capability development, and operations and provides the foundation for joint education. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/development-concepts-and-doctrine-centre

Notable in this search was the apparent absence of a single U.S. institution tasked with addressing hybrid challenges and threats in a national, coordinated manner. The E.U. appears to be more advanced in this area with overarching governmental policies in place that have implemented such institutions. One of the most notable and active appears to be the E.U.’s Hybrid Center of Excellence (Hybrid CoE) managed by the Swedish Defense University. In April 2016, the E.U. published the “Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – a European Union Response.” Initiatives within this document were the genesis of the E.U. Hybrid CoE. Later, in December 2016, a common set of proposals for implementation of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of NATO for countering hybrid threats was endorsed by the Council of the European Union and the North Atlantic Council [1].
The Hybrid CoE is made up of organizations from different E.U. member countries specializing in various hybrid defense areas that are dedicated to furthering a common understanding of hybrid threats and promoting the development of comprehensive, whole-of-government response at national levels and of coordinated response at E.U. and NATO levels in countering hybrid threats. Similar to the U.S. DoD Reliance 21 initiative, the E.U. Hybrid CoE establishes a joint framework that provides solutions and advice to senior-level political leaders, policy and decision makers, and warfighters. This framework is achieved through an ecosystem and infrastructure that provides for education, information sharing, alignment of effort, coordination of priorities, and support across the E.U. government and military enterprise. Also similar to Reliance 21, the Hybrid CoE is supported by Communities of Interest (COIs). In the case of the Hybrid CoE, the COIs are managed by various member countries and include Coordination & Support, Hybrid Influencing COI (UK), Sub-COI on Non-State Actors (SWE), Strategy & Defense COI (DE), and Vulnerabilities & Resilience COI (FIN) [1–3].

2.2 HYBRID THREAT FRAMEWORKS AND OVERARCHING ACTIVITIES

Catalogued materials/references relating to hybrid threat frameworks are presented in Sections 2.2.1 (U.S) and 2.2.2 (E.U. and U.K.). For relevancy and expediency, the search was generally limited to materials dated within the past 4 years (2015 and newer). Most of the documents cited are available on request from DSIAC, if you are unable to access them through the listed links.

Note: For clarity, the documents produced by these activities/organizations are listed here under the organizations that developed them.

2.2.1 U.S. Frameworks

   a. Cyberspace Solarium Commission Overview; 2018; U.S. Senator Ben Sasse, Nebraska
   https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/cf57ede8-1b02-47c3-b41b-d3898edeb9ef/solarium-fact-sheet.pdf
   b. A Cyber Solarium Project; 20180117; LAWFARE; Klon Kitchen, Founder Kraken Wurx Strategies (technology and national security consulting company) and Fellow for National Security, Technology, Cyber, and Science, Heritage Foundation
   https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-solarium-project
2. **U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).** The JCS publishes overarching documents providing guidance for planning and response execution for all aspects of warfare including those related to illiberal and nonstate actor hybrid threats.

   a. **Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning (JCIC);** 20180316. The JCIC establishes a framework and policies to remedy the deficiencies of U.S. legacy defense establishment processes that presuppose clearly defined states of peace and war. The goal is to improve the ability of the Joint Force to face challenges in an operating environment where hostile forces are seeking to undermine U.S. interests without triggering an overt conflict. The JCIC attempts to define integrated campaigning with participation by the U.S. Joint Force and interorganizational partners to achieve and maintain policy aims. The JCIC describes integrating military activities and aligning nonmilitary activities of sufficient scope, scale, simultaneity, and duration across multiple domains. In addition, it presents a methodology with associated capabilities that enables the Joint Force to collaborate and synchronize with interorganizational partners and conduct globally integrated operations to achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes.  
   

   b. **Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations;** 20010910. This publication provides guidance for conducting joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations. It presents joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team. Often called the “linchpin” of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy, Joint Publication 3-0 overarching concepts and principles provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This comprehensive document addresses all key aspects of joint warfighting and military operations other than war, where many of today’s military activities are focused.  
   

   c. **Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War;** 19950616. This publication describes the basic tenets of military operations other than war (MOOTW) including a general description of all types of operations and planning considerations necessary for effective execution. It is the first in a series of publications on tactics, techniques, and procedures that provide additional detail on the more complex MOOTW. Joint Publication 3-07 explains how MOOTW differ from large-scale, sustained combat operations, and it addresses purpose, principles, types of operations, and planning
considerations. A doctrinal basis is provided for related joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) publications, which address specific types of MOOTW. https://www.dsiac.org/resources/reference-documents/joint-publication-3-07-joint-doctrine-military-operations-other-war-16

3. The U.S. White House and U.S. Secretary of Defense

   a. National Security Strategy (NSS); 201802. The NSS maintains that, in addition to the threats posed to the U.S. by rogue regimes and violent extremist organizations that have been a central focus of national security policy since the end of the Cold War, great power rivalries and competition have once again become a central feature of the international security landscape. To advance U.S. interests effectively within this strategic context, the Administration argues, the U.S. must improve domestic American security and bolster economic competitiveness while rebuilding its military. The NSS is organized into four interconnected “pillars”: 1) protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; 2) promote American posterity; 3) preserve peace through strength; and 4) enhance American influence. More information on the NSS is available at the following links:

      i. National Security Strategy of the United States of America; 201712; The White House

      ii. CRS IN10842, The 2017 National Security Strategy: Issues for Congress; 20171219; Congressional Research Service (CRS) (two-page summary of the NSS pillars and key points)
         https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10842.pdf

   b. National Defense Strategy (NDS); 20180119. The NDS articulates how the DoD will advance U.S. objectives articulated in the NSS. In addition to stating the DoD’s approach to contending with current and emerging national security challenges, the NDS is also intended to articulate the overall strategic rationale for programs and priorities contained within the FY2019–FY2023 budget requests. Overall, the document maintains that the strategic environment in which the United States must operate is characterized by the erosion of the rules-based international order, which has produced a degree of strategic complexity and volatility not seen "in recent memory" (p. 1). As a result, the document argues, the United States must bolster its competitive military advantage—which the NDS sees as having eroded in recent decades—relative to the threats posed by China and Russia. It further maintains that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national
security.” The NDS is a classified document; however, a summary by The White House and insights from reviews by the CRS or Library of Congress can be found at the following links:

i. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America; 2018; U.S. Secretary of Defense

ii. The 2018 National Defense Strategy; 20180205; CRS (two-page summary of key points and potential questions for Congress)
   https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10855.pdf

2.2.2 E.U. and U.K. Frameworks

1. European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). The establishment of the Hybrid CoE was defined in/supported by the EDA Capability Development Plan (see Framework 2 in this section) and a common set of proposals written in a joint declaration by the European Council, European Commission, and NATO in 2016. Other Hybrid CoE publications and their links are listed as follows:
   a. Common Set of Proposals for the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 2016
   b. The Resurrection of ‘Active Measures’: Intelligence Services as a Part of Russia’s Influencing Toolbox; 201804
   c. From Nudge to Novichok: The Response to the Skripal Nerve Agent Attack Holds Lessons for Countering Hybrid Threats; 201804
   d. Countering Hybrid Threats: Role of Private Sector Increasingly Important. Shared Responsibility Needed; 201803
e. Hybrid Threats as a New ‘Wicked Problem’ for Early Warning; 201803

f. Beyond Fake News: Content Confusion and Understanding the Dynamics of the Contemporary Media Environment; 201802

g. Blurred Lines: Hybrid Threats and the Politics of International Law; 201801

h. Addressing Hybrid Threats; 2018

i. Laws in the Era of Hybrid Threats; 201712, 201710


k. In the Era of Hybrid Threats: Power of the Powerful or Power of the “Weak”?: 201710

l. Regional Cooperation to Support National Hybrid Defence Efforts; 201710

2. European Defense Agency (EDA), Capability Development Plan (CDP) (part of which defines E.U. priority actions for Hybrid Threats)
   a. Hybrid Warfare; 201605; EDA Hybrid Warfare goals and objectives

   b. CDP Project Goals and Description; 20170616
c. CDP Framework Description

d. CDP Fact Sheet; 20170620

e. CDP Emerging Trends and Key Priorities Brochure

3. European Commission (EC), Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats; 20160406; Parlementaire Monitor
   https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vk30hn8tljz9?ctx=vga3bu zdwirl&tab=1&start_tab0=240

4. Singapore Air Force (RSAF), Framework for Identifying Requirements in the Design of Multi-Domain Command & Control Information System for Tri-Service Integration; 2017; Pointer Journal

5. UK Ministry of Defense (UK MOD), Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC);
The DCDC link provides information on the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC), which was designed to develop and deliver new capabilities to enhance partnerships and effectiveness in joint, multinational, and coalition operations including those in response to hybrid threats. Also, links can be found to access Allied Joint Publications (AIPs), doctrine for NATO operations; Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs), fully endorsed national doctrine, and Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs), which are provided to encourage debate and capture and disseminate best practices.
MCDC-related links are listed as follows:

a. Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC); 20170928; UK Ministry of Defense; Multinational Capability Development College

b. MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare (CHW) Project - Multinational project to help understand the nature and character of modern hybrid threats.

   i. MCDC Countering Hybrid Warfare Project: Understanding Hybrid Warfare, 201701
c. MCDC Understand to Prevent (U2P) Project - Military Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Conflict; 20170620; Multinational project to determine how defence forces can prevent violent conflict

i. MCDC Understand to Prevent (U2P) Project: the Military Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Conflict; 201411

ii. MCDC Understand to Prevent (U2P) Project: the Military Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Conflict Short Guide; 201411

iii. MCDC Understand to Prevent (U2P) Project: the Military Contribution to the Prevention of Violent Conflict Handbook; 201404

2.2.3 Other Framework Documents

1. Warfare as Violent Politics: An Integrated Framework for Analyzing Armed Threats, 20180502, War on the Rocks, Director of the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program and an Associate Professor at the College of International Security Affairs of the National Defense University

2. Thesis: Identifying ‘Hybrid Warfare’; 2016; Leiden University, Netherlands; Manon van Tienhoven (The thesis attempts to demonstrate that when using a framework of hybrid warfare perspectives to identify hybrid warfare in practice, the definitions of hybrid warfare and its elements are too general, which leads to doubt of its added value in the debate.)
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/53645/2016_Tienhoven_van_CSM.pdf?sequence=1
2.3 HYBRID WARFARE POLICY-RELATED DOCUMENTS

Catalogued materials/references relating to hybrid warfare policy are presented in the following list. For relevancy and expediency, the search was generally limited to materials dated within the past 4 years (2015 and newer). If you are unable to access the documents through the listed links, most are available on request from DSIAC.

Additionally, other materials related to hybrid threats and warfare that may be more focused on defining the threat and operational implementation of responses are listed in Appendix A. The following references may also provide significant information on frameworks, policy, and its implementation.

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BIOGRAPHIES

Scott Armistead is a DSIAC SME who currently works as the DSIAC Senior Staff Engineer. Mr. Armistead served as a Test Engineer, Program Engineer, and Technical Advisor in the DoD and as a Test Manager for the Joint Munitions Test & Evaluation Program Office. He has nearly 35 years of experience in developmental, Live Fire, and operational research, development, test, and evaluation of DoD munitions, weapon systems, and platforms to include both kinetic and nonkinetic effects as well as development of planning and execution methodologies and documentation; modeling, simulation, and analysis tools; and forensics instrumentation, software, and techniques to support these efforts. He has supported numerous General Officer Steering Committees and command-level Joint and Tri-Service Red Teams, Integrated Product Teams, Working Groups, and roadmap development efforts. Mr. Armistead received his B.A. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Florida.

Dominic Ju is a DSIAC SME and Marine Corps veteran who has been serving the military and commercial markets and academia since 2000. Mr. Ju currently is the Managing Principal and Co-Founder of BluePath Labs, an IAC support teammate. He has supported clients across the DoD, Intelligence Community (IC), and civilian agencies such as the Army TechWargaming program, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), multiple combatant commands (COCOMs), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). Mr. Ju also has experience working with Special Operations Forces. He has led civil-military teams to evaluate strategic plans and business processes, identify requirements, and assess risks for acquisition programs valued in excess of $2B USD to align emerging strategic initiatives with budgetary and fiscal realities. Mr. Ju received his B.A. from Tufts University and M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
APPENDIX A: Hybrid Threats and Warfare
Documents and Articles

Guides, Journal Articles, Papers, Regulations, and Reports Related to Hybrid Threats and Warfare

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18. Cyber Threats in Hybrid Warfare: Securing the Cyber Space for the RSAF; 2017; Pointer Journal, Singapore Air Force (RSAF)

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Other Materials Related to Hybrid Threats and Warfare
1. SMARTbooks – Threat, OPFOR, Regional & Cultural Set
   - CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook
   - OPFOR SMARTbook 3 – Red Team Army
   - Cultural Guide SMARTbook 1 – Afghanistan
   - HDS1: The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook

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