This paper considers a distributed beamforming and resource allocation technique for a radar system in the presence of multiple targets. The primary objective of each radar is to minimize its transmission power while attaining an optimal beamforming strategy and satisfying a certain detection criterion for each of the targets. Therefore, we use convex optimization methods together with noncooperative and partially cooperative game theoretic approaches. Initially, we consider a strategic noncooperative game (SNG), where there is no communication between the various radars of the system. Hence each radar selfishly determines its optimal beamforming and power allocation. Subsequently, we assume a more coordinated game theoretic approach incorporating a pricing mechanism. Introducing a price in the utility function of each radar/player enforces beamformers to minimize the interference induced to other radars and to increase the social fairness of the system. Furthermore, we formulate a Stackelberg game by adding a surveillance radar to the system model, which will play the role of the leader, and hence the remaining radars will be the followers. The leader applies a pricing policy of interference charged to the followers aiming at maximizing his profit while keeping the incoming interference under a certain threshold.We also present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) in both the partially cooperative and non cooperative games. Finally, the simulation results confirm the convergence of the algorithm in all three cases.
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